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Who Watches the Watchers in Public
Corruption Cases?
Richard E. Myers Ilt
INTRODUCTION
Prosecutors managing public corruption1 cases face numer-
ous longstanding and well-known challenges: potential allega-
tions of political motivation, the possibility of divided loyalties
among the agencies or departments that they rely upon to build
cases, and defendants who may have more experience with and
more access to the news media than the prosecutors themselves.
Another critical challenge, and the one that is the focus of this
Article, is the challenge presented when attempting to balance
two important public interests: the public's concerns as victims
and voters on the one hand, and the defendant's right to a fair
trial uncontaminated by excessive pretrial publicity on the other.
Unlike the ordinary criminal case, where the victim class is cir-
cumscribed to the point where the prosecutor can identify and
communicate directly with the victims-indeed, they are often
her witnesses-in public corruption cases the victims are often
the entire venire. Engaging in communication at the level that
exists in other contexts would unfairly contaminate the jury pool.
One solution to the problem is to permit the prosecutor to serve
as the public's proxy. But this approach leaves in place all of the
''occupational hazards of the dedicated prosecutor; the danger of
too narrow a focus, of the loss of perspective, [and] of preoccupa-
tion with the pursuit of one alleged suspect to the exclusion of
t George R. Ward Chaired Associate Professor of Law, UNC School of Law; BA 1989,
MA 1994, University of North Carolina at Wilmington; JD 1998, University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill. My research assistant, Anna Spence, provided invaluable help
with this Article.
1 For purposes of this Article, I will adopt the definition proposed by Norman
Abrams: "any criminal offense(s) committed by governmental officials related to, or grow-
ing out of, their governmental duties." Norman Abrams, The Distance Imperative: A Dif-
ferent Way of Thinking About Public Official Corruption Investigations/Prosecutions and
the Federal Role, 42 Loyola U Chi L J 207, 211 (2011).
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other interests";2 concerns that helped give rise to the victims'
rights movement in the first instance. The hazards are com-
pounded by either valence of the political motivation accusation:
the prosecutor is being too lenient as a fellow insider, or too
harsh as a politically motivated opponent of the defendant.
This Article proposes a possible solution, one more conso-
nant with the challenges of public corruption cases: choose a
panel of victims from the class of affected citizens to serve as a
proxy for the larger whole. This solution will ensure that the
multiple perspectives anticipated by the victims' rights move-
ment are indeed represented. Choosing public individuals to par-
ticipate in the criminal justice system is a very old idea-one en-
shrined in the grand jury and petit jury provisions of the. Consti-
tution.3 But in a world where the grand jury is often silenced by
rule (and for good reasons),4 and petit juries are mostly avoided,
this proposal reinserts a public panel as a check on-and inserts
the eyes of the public into-the criminal justice process in those
cases most affecting public confidence in government.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I describes the his-
toric challenges regarding political motivation, public confidence,
and pretrial publicity in public corruption cases. Part II describes
historic checks and their limits: the press (as the public's proxy)
and the historic conflict between its desire to reveal information
and the defendant's desire for privacy and right to a fair trial;
the special prosecutor; and the existing citizens' proxies, the
grand jury and the petit jury-as well as the oversight and lim-
ited government motivations behind those institutions. Part III
proposes another public participation mechanism-the proxy
victim panel-specifically for public corruption cases, and com-
pares it briefly to the rise of the victims' rights movement, and
the passage of the federal Victims' Rights Act and its state ana-
logues. Part IV concludes.
2 Brief for Edward H. Levi, Griffin B. Bell, and William French Smith as Amici
Curiae in Support ofAppellees, Morrison v Olson, No 87-1279, *11 (S Ct filed Apr 8, 1988)
(available on Westlaw at 1988 WL 1031601) ("Morrison Brief').
3 For a broader discussion of the checks and balances, see Rachel E. Barkow, Sepa-
ration of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 Stan L Rev 989, 1012 (2006) ("One of the
animating features of the Constitution is its preoccupation with the regulation of the
government's criminal powers.").
4 Grand juries in the federal system operate under the constraints of Rule 6(e) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which, inter alia, prohibits disclosure of matters
appearing before the grand jury by the members of the grand jury and by attorneys for
the government. See FRCrP 6(e)(2)(B). This Rule protects people who might otherwise
face opprobrium arising from the simple existence of an investigation, whether or not
charges are ultimately warranted.
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I. HISTORIC CHALLENGES IN PUBLIC CORRUPTION CASES-
PROSECUTION WITHOUT FEAR OR FAVOR
The problem is a very old one: "Quis custodiet ipsos custo-
des?"5 Who watches the watchmen? It has vexed government
scholars since before Plato proposed his Republic, but has not yet
been successfully answered. As the saying now goes, it is not im-
portant just that justice be done, it must be seen to be done.6
We place great power in the hands of prosecutors in the
American system. In most states and the federal system, they
are the gatekeepers of the initiation of a criminal prosecution.
We give them this power because we believe that an impartial
minister of justice gives us our best chance at a fair system of
criminal justice. But the politicized prosecutor--one who fails to
prosecute cronies or gives them the proverbial slap on the wrist,
while aggressively pursuing his political enemies for violations
real or imagined-has become the stuff of legend.7 Whether we
fear that prosecutors will be afraid to prosecute powerful people,
or be politically beholden to them, inaction can be the result of
"fear or favor."8 Obversely, high-level defendants often level
charges that the prosecutors pursuing them are engaged in the
political version of a "witch hunt," and in some cases there may
be truth to the accusations.9
Prosecutors do take an oath to pursue justice regardless of
the possible risks or benefits.10 But that oath is only as good as
public confidence in the good faith of those taking it. The Platon-
ic ideal suggests that there is no need to guard the guardians.
But faith in the ideal is not universal.
5 Ascribed to Roman poet Juvenal in the Satires. Juvenal, Satires, VI: 346-47.
6 The quotation more fully is often attributed to Lord Chief Justice Hewart, writing
in The King v Sussex Justices, [1924] 1 KB 256, 259 ("[A] long line of cases shows that it
is not merely of some importance but is of fundamental importance that justice should
not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.").
7 See Anthony S. Barkow and Beth George, Prosecuting Political Defendants, 44 Ga
L Rev 953, 991 (2010) ("Public perception of prosecutions of political actors is particularly
sensitive.").
8 See, for example, Abrams, 42 Loyola U Chi L J at 223 (cited in note 1) ("When a
high-level government official at the local, state, or federal level is under suspicion for
corruption, the public will often have concerns that political connections may operate
behind the scenes to influence law enforcement decisions.").
9 See Barkow and George, 44 Ga L Rev at 991 (cited in note 7) ("If the public per-
ceives that prosecutors are targeting their political enemies rather than defending the
public interest, the public will lose trust in the administration of criminal justice.").
10 See, for example, Prosecuting Attorneys' Council of Georgia, Assistant District
Attorney Oath of Office (2012), online at http:I/www.pacga.org/site/content/53 (visited
Sept 10, 2012). See also R. Michael Cassidy, Prosecutorial Ethics 4-5 (West 2005).
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One way to maintain oversight is political-elect the prose-
cutors, as many states do.11 But concerns about the politics of
money and cronyism can make that limit feel like cold comfort.
United States Attorneys serve at the pleasure of the president-
for example, President Clinton summarily fired all of the sitting
United States Attorneys when he took office-but there is a polit-
ical component of firing them for cause. 12 The political uproar
over the firing of seven appointed United States Attorneys dur-
ing the administration of President George W. Bush amply
demonstrated the balancing act: a president is supposed to ap-
point, manage, and control federal prosecutors and set the priori-
ties that the Department of Justice will follow-but will pay a
political price if he is perceived to be firing prosecutors for politi-
cal reasons. 13
In public corruption cases, where the very essence of the
prosecution is an absence of good faith on the part of a govern-
ment official, the limitations of a claim of "trust me, I promise to
be good" are highlighted.
As a society, we value prosecutorial independence-from the
defense, from the legislature, from the judiciary, from witch-
hunting members of the public-but also accountability to those
exact actors (minus the witch-hunters). Managing that balance
can be difficult. 14
II. CONTROL MECHANISMS
As a nation, we have added multiple mechanisms to try to
strike the oversight/fairness balance. I will consider, very briefly,
several of these, some constitutionally mandated and others add-
ed by the legislature. The framers of the United States Constitu-
tion were skeptical of the concentration of power, and they
sought to solve that problem by dividing power vertically and
horizontally, and allocating rights to citizens inside and outside
11 See Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor Elections Fail Us, 6 Ohio St J Crim L 581,
589 (2009).
12 See Associated Press, Clinton Opens Up About U.S. Attorney Firings (NBC News
Mar 26, 2007), online at http://www.msnbc.msn.comlid/17801225/ns/politics-decision_08/t/
clinton-opens-about-us-attorney-firings/#.Tyq47COJ8ZA (visited Sept 10, 2012).
13 See James Eisenstein, The U.S. Attorney Firings of 2006: Main Justice's Centrali-
zation Efforts in Historical Context, 31 Seattle U L Rev 219, 219 (2008).
14 See, for example, Barkow and George, 44 Ga L Rev at 955 (cited in note 7)
("[Ploliticians and other politically enmeshed actors must answer for the crimes they
commit. The problem, however, is that the prosecution of these cases raises the suspicion
that prosecutors are pursuing such defendants for their politics rather than for their
criminal acts.").
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the government: a free press, the grand jury, and the petit jury
are all constitutionally protected checks on government power.
The legislature has also entered the fray; it has experimented
with the independent counsel and expanded victims' rights to
confer with prosecutors in criminal cases. I will consider each of
these in turn.
A. A Free Press
One oversight mechanism that might be used to solve the in-
terested prosecutor problem is the free press. Operating in public
view, prosecutors will be subject to all of the political checks and
balances that constrain other functionaries. However, there is a
countervailing question-the fair trial right of the defendant-
and the balance is often struck against the press.
Pretrial publicity is a good thing if you are a member of the
public who wants to know what the government is doing. It
respects the values embedded in the First Amendment to the
Constitution, permits the public to know and understand what
the prosecutor is thinking and doing, and promotes good gov-
ernment generally. It is also potentially a bad thing. If you are
the defendant, defense counsel, an advocate of fair trials for de-
fendants, or a believer in decisions on the merits in criminal cas-
es, then the values enshrined in the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and the fair and public trial
values of the Sixth Amendment would lead you to oppose pretrial
publicity, which places those values at risk.15 Balancing the First
and the Sixth Amendments is no easy task.16
The pendulum has swung back and forth over time. In what
may be fast becoming a relic of a time when jurors came from a
single slice of the populace, the Supreme Court once observed
that the press plays a crucial role in bringing attention to im-
portant cases:
15 See Cassidy, Prosecutorial Ethics at 115-26 (cited in note 10) (discussing the com-
plex relationship in a chapter entitled "The Prosecutor and the Press"). See also Scott M.
Matheson Jr, The Prosecutor, The Press, and Free Speech, 58 Fordham L Rev 865 (1990).
16 For example, Justice Holmes, in Patterson v Colorado, 205 US 454 (1907), suggest-
ed waiting until the trial is over to go to the press. "When a case is finished, courts are
subject to the same criticism as other people, but the propriety and necessity of prevent-
ing interference with the course of justice by premature statement, argument or intimida-
tion hardly can be denied." Id at 463. See also Sheppard v Maxwell, 384 US 333, 363
(1966) (finding a Sixth Amendment violation and overturning a defendant's conviction
based on pretrial publicity and the atmosphere at trial); Gentile v State Bar of Nevada,
501 US 1030, 1033-34 (1991) (finding that First Amendment concerns rendered a statute
regulating attorney speech unenforceable).
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[E]very case of public interest is almost, as a matter of ne-
cessity, brought to the attention of all the intelligent peo-
ple in the vicinity, and scarcely any one can be found
among those best fitted for jurors who has not read or
heard of it, and who has not some impression or some
opinion in respect to its merits.17
The system handles those challenges through voir dire,
which is designed to weed out not those who have some opinion,
but those who can no longer decide fairly. And fairness is the
central question.
The American Bar Association adopted Rule 3.6 of the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct to address the balance between
public knowledge and the danger of unfair prejudice.18 It pro-
vides in pertinent part:
A lawyer who is participating or has participated in the
investigation or litigation of a matter shall not make an
extrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows or reason-
ably should know will be disseminated by means of public
communication and will have a substantial likelihood of
materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the
matter.19
Limiting the restriction to statements that will have a "sub-
stantial likelihood of materially prejudicing" the case respects
some of the First Amendment concerns, but many prosecutors
are cautious about saying anything that falls outside the litany
of facts pertaining to the investigation and charge that are ex-
pressly permitted by the rule.20
17 Reynolds v United States, 98 US 145, 155-56 (1878).
1s See ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.6 (2011).
19 Id at (a).
20 Rule 3.6(b) permits the prosecutor to provide the following:
(1) the claim, offense or defense involved and, except when prohibited by law,
the identity of the persons involved;
(2) information contained in a public record;
(3) that an investigation of a matter is in progress;
(4) the scheduling or result of any step in litigation;
(5) a request for assistance in obtaining evidence and information necessary
thereto;
(6) a warning of danger concerning the behavior of a person involved, when
there is reason to believe that there exists the likelihood of substantial harm to
an individual or to the public interest; and
(7) in a criminal case, in addition to subparagraphs (1) through (6):
[ 201218
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While prosecutors are rarely disciplined, there have been
high-profile cases involving prosecutor discipline for precisely
such conduct. 21 In Gentile v State Bar of Nevada,22 in an opinion
by Justice Kennedy, a five-member majority of the Court over-
turned on vagueness grounds the criminal conviction of a defense
lawyer based on statements he had made while acting as defense
counsel.23 The Court based its decision in part on the difficulties
that the lawyer faced in determining whether he fell within the
safe harbor permitted by law. 2 4 Gentile held a press conference
the day after his client's indictment, accusing a police officer,
rather than his client, of engaging in the theft and drug activities
with which Gentile's client was charged. 25 A different majority of
the Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, upheld the
''substantial likelihood of material prejudice" language in Model
Rule 3.6 against a First Amendment attack.26
However one feels about the balance ultimately struck by
Model Rule 3.6, it is the rule in the vast majority of jurisdictions,
and significantly limits the use of voluntary (or mandated)
statements to the media as an oversight mechanism for prosecu-
torial conduct pretrial, even in cases where the members of the
public are arguably the victims.
B. The Grand Jury
To bring a federal charge, a prosecutor typically must seek
an indictment from a grand jury, and then to convict the defend-
(i) the identity, residence, occupation and family status of the accused;
(ii) if the accused has not been apprehended, information necessary to aid in
apprehension of that person;
(iii) the fact, time and place of arrest; and
(iv) the identity of investigating and arresting officers or agencies and the
length of the investigation.
Id at (b).
21 See Laurie L. Levenson, Prosecutorial Sound Bites: When Do They Cross the Line?,
44 Ga L Rev 1021, 1040 (2010). For a discussion of the disbarment of Mike Nifong based
in part on inflammatory and prejudicial statements regarding Duke University lacrosse
players accused of rape, see Robert P. Mosteller, Exculpatory Evidence, Ethics, and the
Road to the Disbarment of Mike Nifong: The Critical Importance of Full Open-File Discov-
ery, 15 Geo Mason L Rev 257 (2008).
22 501 US 1030 (1991).
23 Id at 1033-34.
24 Id at 1057 (discussing the difficulty of determining how to make arguments under
the safe harbor).
25 Id at 1033, 1039-42.
26 Gentile, 501 US at 1075.
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ant, she must prove those allegations to a petit jury, with the
members of both bodies drawn from the district wherein the
crimes were committed. The grand jury is a critical historical
institution-it serves as a check on government by placing a
panel of citizens between the prosecution and the defendant, and
requiring that the prosecutor demonstrate probable cause that a
crime has been committed before going forward. Indeed, as Roger
Fairfax has demonstrated, for a century and a half, federal
courts treated the existence of a grand jury indictment as juris-
dictional-federal jurisdiction did not and could not arise in a
criminal case unless a grand jury indictment had been secured. 27
This view changed in the 1940s, when the Federal Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure were rewritten to make the grand jury indictment
a waivable right of the defendant. 28
This limitation is actually critical in public corruption cases
because collusive prosecutors and politically connected defend-
ants, in cases where there has been a strong public outcry, might
collaborate to deliberately undercharge and enter a guilty plea to
a lesser crime arising out of a course of conduct. If done well, the
collusion could cap the defendant's exposure to a low statutory
maximum, removing from the reach of judicial oversight and
sentencing much of the relevant conduct, while creating a double
jeopardy bar to later prosecution.
This collusion can happen because the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure (FRCrP) now contemplate bypassing the
grand jury altogether in certain cases. According to FRCrP 7,
"An offense punishable by imprisonment for more than one year
may be prosecuted by information if the defendant-in open
court and after being advised of the nature of the charge and of
the defendant's rights-waives prosecution by indictment."29 The
ability to waive indictment and proceed via information allows
the collusive prosecutor to proceed without the oversight of the
public in the form of the grand jury.30
27 Roger A. Fairfax Jr, The Jurisdictional Heritage of the Grand Jury Clause, 91
Minn L Rev 398, 416-23 (2006).
28 See id at 446.
29 FRCrP 7(b).
30 The Advisory Committee notes to FRCrP 7(b) suggest several defendant-protective
reasons for permitting the rule, principally related to speedy trial concerns. They do not
appear to contemplate the collusive public prosecution problem. See FRCrP 7, Advisory
Committee Notes to the 1944 Amendments, Note to Subdivision (b). This risk is cabined if
the case is sufficiently high profile that grand jurors are independently aware of its exist-
ence and are led by a member that has sufficient initiative to go beyond the ordinary
process, which is prosecutor led. In some states, the grand jury can issue an indictment
20 [ 2012
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C. The Petit Jury
Another critical place where the public is permitted to par-
ticipate in the criminal justice system is the jury trial. The Sixth
Amendment to the Constitution, as incorporated through the
Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees criminal defendants the
right to a jury trial in "serious" cases.31 This is thought to be a
crucial check on government power. However, like the grand ju-
ry, this right, too, is deemed to belong to the defendant and is
now waivable. 32 Our entire system of plea bargaining and rapid
justice as currently constituted depends on that fact.
A politically connected defendant might very well want to
avoid trial by jury in favor of trial by a judge with whom he or
she has influence. There are some mechanisms through which a
prosecutor might assert the public's right of oversight and refuse
to consent to such a waiver.33 However, if the prosecutor is in on
the charade, the prosecutor might not assert that right.
In public corruption cases in particular, a defendant might
also fear the anger of the public, or fear that a jury within the
district will necessarily be composed of victims of the corruption.
Other mechanisms, such as change of venue, might recognize
both concerns, but need not be invoked. Whatever the motiva-
tion, the system allows such cases to be removed from public
oversight and a structured plea entered.
D. Independent Counsel
In a subset of public corruption cases involving high-level
federal officials, the United States has tried a different solution,
establishing a mechanism for appointing an independent counsel
operating outside the executive branch, designed to insulate the
prosecutor from political pressure.34 The independent counsel
on its own, request its own counsel, suggest charges with a reference by a prosecutor, or
go to the empanelling judge. In egregious cases its members might go public. See Wayne
R. Lafave, et al, Criminal Procedure 446-47 (West 5th ed 2009).
31 See Jeff E. Butler, Petty Offenses, Serious Consequences: Multiple Petty Offenses
and the Sixth Amendment Right to Jury Trial, 94 Mich L Rev 872, 872 (1995).
32 See, for example, Patton v United States, 281 US 276 (1930); FRCrP 23(a) (con-
templating waiver of jury trial in federal cases).
3 See FRCrP 23(a)(2) (requiring the government to consent to the defendant's waiver
of a jury trial).
34 See Ethics in Government Act of 1978 § 601, Pub L No 95-521, 92 Stat 1867 (1978),
codified at 28 USC §§ 591-99; Ethics in Government Act Amendments of 1982, Pub L No
97-409, 96 Stat 2039 (1983), codified in various sections of Title 28. For an extensive
discussion of the nuts and bolts of the statute's operation, written by someone who served
as independent counsel, see generally Donald C. Smaltz, The Independent Counsel: A
21
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM
statute, first passed in 1978, permitted a special panel of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit to appoint a prosecutor, outside the traditional government
structure. Independent counsel would investigate allegations of
wrongdoing leveled against the President, cabinet members, and
certain other high officials in the executive branch. The statute
was upheld by the Supreme Court against a separation of powers
challenge in Morrison v Olson.35 But as Justice Scalia's dissent
suggested, removing the independent counsel from political over-
sight comes with potential costs. A truly independent counsel,
unlike a traditional prosecutor, has very limited accountability, a
singular focus, and extensive resources.3 6 First one political party
then the other complained, as their administrations became the
targets of independent counsel. Lawrence Walsh ran the Iran-
Contra investigation, ultimately focusing on a Republican
Secretary of Defense; then Kenneth Starr ran the White-
water/Monica Lewinsky investigation of a Democratic presi-
dent.37 The Independent Counsel Act became highly controver-
sial, and was allowed to sunset on June 30, 1999.38
In Morrison, Justice Scalia quoted from the brief filed on be-
half of three ex-Attorneys General, Edward H. Levi, Griffin B.
Bell, and William French Smith:
The problem is less spectacular but much more worri-
some. It is that the institutional environment of the Inde-
pendent Counsel-specifically, her isolation from the Ex-
ecutive Branch and the internal checks and balances it
supplies-is designed to heighten, not to check, all of the
occupational hazards of the dedicated prosecutor; the
danger of too narrow a focus, of the loss of perspective, of
View From Inside, 86 Georgetown L J 2307 (1998) (describing his experiences and outlin-
ing the history and operations of the independent counsel statute).
3 487 US 654, 659-60 (1988).
36 See, for example, Joseph E. diGenova, The Independent Counsel Act: A Good Time
to End a Bad Idea, 86 Georgetown L J 2299, 2301 (1998) ("What a dangerous creature we
have now loosed upon our system of checks and balances: an independent counsel, re-
movable only for cause, who in a real sense does not answer to Congress, the executive, or
the judiciary, and, worst of all, is in no way accountable to the people.").
3 See Symposium, The Independent Counsel Act: From Watergate to Whitewater and
Beyond, 86 Georgetown L J 2011, 2011-2389 (1998).
38 See A Symposium on Morrison v. Olson: Addressing the Constitutionality of the
Independent Counsel Statute, 38 Am U L Rev 255, 255-393 (1989); Sixty-Seventh Judicial
Conference of the Fourth Circuit, The Independent Counsel Process: Is It Broken and How
Should It Be Fixed?, 54 Wash & Lee L Rev 1515, 1515-98 (1997); Symposium, 86
Georgetown L J at 2011-2389 (cited in note 37).
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preoccupation with the pursuit of one alleged suspect to
the exclusion of other interests. 39
The insider's perspective creates those occupational hazards,
which may in fact come to fruition in a subset of cases. Public
knowledge that such hazards exist leads outsiders to question
whether the hazards drove decision making in any particular
case, even where they did not.
E. Crime Victims' Rights
The Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA)40 was passed in
2004.41 The CVRA creates rights of consultation, participation,
and allocution for crime victims. "[C]rime victims" are defined as
those "directly and proximately harmed as a result of the com-
mission of a federal offense or an offense in the District of Co-
lumbia."42 Specifically, victims must be informed of proceedings;
and they may meet with the prosecutor and be heard regarding
filing and dismissal of charges, attend trials unless countervail-
ing factors prevail, and be heard at sentencing. 43 Additionally,
there is a "right to be treated with fairness and with respect for
the victim's dignity and privacy."44 Perhaps most significantly,
the CVRA provides victims with the right to be heard before a
judge accepts any plea. 4 5 The rights may be enforced via a writ of
mandamus, which can be sought by the crime victim, the victim's
lawful representative, or by the attorney for the government.46
According to Professor Paul Cassell, such rights "form part of the
checks and balances that ensure a properly functioning criminal
justice process."47 Nonetheless, the approach has its critics, who
contend that the CVRA might "threaten the fair and just adjudi-
cation of a criminal case."48
39 Morrison, 487 US at 731 (Scalia dissenting), citing Morrison Brief at *11 (cited in
note 2).
40 Justice for All Act of 2004, Title I, § 102(a), Pub L No 108-405, 118 Stat 2260,
2261-62, codified at 18 USC § 3771.
41 Justice for All Act of 2004 § 102(a), 118 Stat at 2261-62.
42 18 USC § 3771(e).
43 18 USC § 3771(a).
44 18 USC § 3771(a)(8).
45 18 USC § 3771(a)(4).
46 18 USC § 3771(d).
47 Paul G. Cassell and Steven Joffee, The Crime Victim's Expanding Role in a System
of Public Prosecution: A Response to the Critics of the Crime Victims' Rights Act, 105 Nw
U L Rev Colloquy 164, 181 (2010).
4 Danielle Levine, Note, Public Wrongs and Private Rights: Limiting the Victim's
23
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There are, however, significant impediments to using the
CVRA to enforce citizen participation in public corruption cases.
Under current regulations, the rights may not arise at all, be-
cause the defendant in a public corruption case would most likely
be deemed not to have directly and proximately harmed the vic-
tims in the class. 4 9 In such cases, no individual has standing to
assert the rights that the CVRA creates.
Second, the CVRA also provides that when "the court finds
that the number of crime victims makes it impracticable to ac-
cord all the crime victims [the panoply of rights created by the
statute], the court shall fashion a reasonable procedure to give
effect to this chapter that does not unduly complicate or prolong
the proceedings."50 The courts have significant leeway to permit
the attorneys for the government to avoid many of the CVRA du-
ties where the class is large and fully involving its members
would be unwieldy. In practice, this may mean that the public is
excluded altogether.51
Given these significant limitations, the CVRA as it now
stands is not the solution. But it offers a model that can be readi-
ly adapted.
III. THE PROXY VICTIM PANEL
Given the limitations of the existing constitutional and stat-
utory schemes, how do we reassert citizen oversight over this
subset of cases that has the potential to powerfully affect the
public's perception of governmental legitimacy?
Congress and the several states should pass statutes that
require prosecutors in public corruption cases, and other cases
affecting public confidence in the operation of government, to
assemble a proxy victim panel drawn from the geographic area
affected by the accused's corrupt behavior. The panel would serve
as a stand-in for the entire class of victims. That means that the
proxy victim panel in a case where the governor is accused of
Role in a System of Public Prosecution, 104 Nw U L Rev 335, 361 (2010).
49 For a discussion of these issues in the environmental context, see Judson W. Starr,
Brian L. Flack, and Allison D. Foley, A New Intersection: Environmental Crimes and
Victims' Rights, 23 Nat Resources & Envir 41, 43 (2009) ("While some crimes, such as
murder or fraud, clearly have a 'direct and proximate' effect on an easily identifiable
victim, discerning who the 'victim' is in an environmental crime case poses a greater
obstacle-an obstacle not contemplated by the statute itself.").
50 18 USC § 3771(d)(2).
51 See generally Starr, Flack, and Foley, 23 Nat Resources & Envir 41 (cited in note
49) (discussing such cases in the environmental context).
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public corruption would be drawn from all adults in the state.
Where a county commissioner was accused, the proxy victim
class would be drawn from her county; or for an accused mayor,
from the city or township. They would be permitted to exercise
the full panoply of rights contemplated by the CVRA in other
cases.
The proxy victim class would be permitted to consult with
the prosecutor, to allocute at sentencing, be heard before the en-
try of any plea, and would ultimately be able to report back to
the press and public post-conviction regarding the nature and
quality of the decisions that went into the prosecution. In effect,
they would serve precisely the same oversight and public educa-
tion functions that the grand jury and petit jury serve, but in a
different venue.
Requiring the government to assemble a small proxy class
from the voters and drivers' license rolls in the affected area-
the area where the accused was responsible for implementing the
government action at issue-would not be onerous. Such consul-
tation takes place now in most classes of serious crime. Prosecu-
tors have experience dealing with emotionally charged victims
who have been directly harmed in those cases, so the new subset
would not require learning new skills. Most jurisdictions have
mechanisms in place, in the form of a victims' rights coordinator,
to handle the mundane tasks such as notification and schedul-
ng.
As conceived, the members of the proxy panel would be
drawn from volunteers in the identified victim class. One issue
that requires further thought is the potential self-selection biases
that might arise. Victim participants in proximate harm cases
are currently self-selecting. No one need exercise his or her
rights under the CVRA. Seeking volunteers to serve as repre-
sentatives on the proxy panel may create unforeseen skewing
effects.
IV. CONCLUSION
Public corruption cases are critically important. They are the
point at which we can expect the public's faith in government to
be at its lowest ebb. They are also a point at which the who-
watches-the-watchmen question becomes particularly salient.
We are blessed in the United States with a dedicated staff of pro-
fessionals in our criminal justice system and a deep commitment
to the rule of law. Many prosecutors have personal reputations
for integrity that are of the highest caliber. But not all prosecu-
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tors have such reputations. And there may well be cases where
politically connected defendants suffer from politically motivated
prosecution or benefit from sweetheart deals.
Our system has over time reduced citizen oversight through
professional prosecution instead of private prosecution, and the
interpretation of the constitutional provisions of grand jury in-
dictment and jury trial as defendants' rights that can be waived.
There are significant and perhaps irreducible tensions between
pretrial publicity and the defendant's right to a fair trial that
reduce the press's capacity to serve as a watchdog. The CVRA,
which seeks to create participatory rights in victims, is less likely
to apply in public corruption cases, where proximate harm re-
quirements limit its application.
But oversight is never more important than in public corrup-
tion cases. By creating and enforcing public participation rights
on a manageable scale, the proposed proxy victim panel will help
ensure that, over time, victims' voices will be heard. The public's
interests will be protected through the addition of multiple per-
spectives. Prosecutors will be partially protected by that over-
sight from later charges of self-interest, and public confidence
will hopefully increase. And in the end, justice will be seen to be
done.
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